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1. Introduction
Singapore presents an interesting case of how a country achieves dynamic 
economic development and innovation through the “invitation” strategy of a 
business hub. Despite being a small city-state with limited domestic market 
size and no meaningful hinterland or natural resources to speak of, 
Singapore has managed to transform its economy dramatically over the past 
50 years by leveraging the strengths of other economies. Specifically, it has 
been able to attract (or “invite”) various types of productive resources, in-
cluding foreign capital, foreign technology and foreign workers (both skilled 
and unskilled) to make up for what it lacks. This has helped Singapore not 
only achieve sustained growth and development but also enhance its in-
novative capacity.
Figure 5-1. Singapore’s Strategic Location
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At the time of independence in 1965, Singapore had a land area of only 
581.5 square kilometers and a population of barely two million people. It had 
hardly any endowment of natural resources - not even an adequate supply of 
drinking or industrial water.1) The main comparative advantage it enjoyed at 
that time was its strategic geographical location, which made it a natural 
commercial and trading hub for the region (see Chart 1). The trading hub 
status in turn helped support a number of associated industries such as logis-
tics, transportation, and financial services. The manufacturing activities at 
that time were mostly of the labor-intensive, light industries type. As shows 
in Chart 2, commerce, transportation, and storage accounted for almost 47 
percent of GDP in 1960 with trade services alone taking up 23 percent of 
GDP. Manufacturing accounted for only 11.7 percent of GDP, and financial 
services for 14.4 percent.
Figure 5-2. Changing Share of Singapore Economy (% of GDP)
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Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore (SingStat).
1) Figures taken from http://www.dbs.nus.edu.sg/staff/details/hugh_tan/old/Ch4%20Wast
e-%20and%20Reclaimed%20Land%20p.%2078.pdf and http://www.populstat.info/Asia
/singapoc.htm.
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Today, the economy is far more diversified and sophisticated. In 2015 
manufacturing contributed close to 20 percent of GDP, while finance and 
business provided more than 28 percent.2) Over the past two decades, the 
manufacturing sector has consistently contributed 20 to 25 percent of GDP, 
an official target that remains relevant today as the government seeks to 
maintain a certain degree of diversification in the economy.3) More im-
portantly, there is much greater depth in the economy. Manufacturing activ-
ities have shifted from the labor-intensive to the technology- and the in-
novation-intensive segments, while a large part of the services sector activ-
ities now comes from knowledge-based industries, many of them exportable 
services. 
Singapore has also made significant strides in building up its technological 
and research capability. The gross expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.85% in 1990 to 2.25% in 2004. 
By 2015, it had gone up to 3.5% which put Singapore in the same rank as 
many developed economies.4) In 2015, Singapore was placed seventh in the 
Global Innovation Index, which surveys 141 economies around the world 
and uses 79 indicators across a range of themes.5) At US$56,286, Singapore 
had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world in 2014.6) In the 
words of the country’s founding prime minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, 
Singapore has moved from a “third world” country to a “first world” coun-
2) Figures are taken from SingStat at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/visualising-data/c
harts/share-of-gdp-by-industry. 
3) This contrasts with the situation in Hong Kong, where more than 95 percent of the GDP 
comes from the services sector while manufacturing has virtually been hollowed out.
4) See “National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2013,” A*STAR, December 2014; and “Step 
2015: Science, Technology and Enterprise Pan 2015,” A*STAR, 2015.
5) See Global Innovation Index 2015 by World Intellectual Property Organization, at 
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/userfiles/file/reportpdf/GII-2015-v5.pdf  (page 
32).
6) See World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” GDP per capita (current US$). 
Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
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try in less than 50 years.7) 
The successful transformation of the economy reflects, to a large extent, 
the effectiveness of the development strategy that the Singapore government 
has adopted. Over the past half century, it has positioned the city-state as an 
efficient and highly livable business hub in the region, thereby allowing it to 
attract the strategic resources that it needed, such as global capital and global 
talents. The developmental objectives and the specific strategic resources it 
was looking for might have shifted over time, but the basic approach of pro-
viding an attractive business hub environment to attract these resources re-
mains unchanged. 
Broadly speaking, the Singapore economy can be said to have gone 
through two phases of growth and development. As Tan and Phang (2005) 
noted, phase I (1960s to late 1990s) could be seen as an “efficiency-driven” 
growth phase. During this period, the city-state presented itself as an effi-
cient business hub for multinational corporations (MNCs), and foreign di-
rect investment played a critical role in the growth and development of the 
economy. Helping the MNCs achieve production efficiency was the key fo-
cus of economic policy, and a wide variety of policy instruments including 
massive investment in “efficiency infrastructure” was employed to this end. 
Phase II (early 2000s to date) may be termed as an “innovation-driven” 
growth phase. The country embarked on a journey to transform itself into a 
“global city”, focusing on attracting creative talents to help realize its new vi-
sion of having innovation and increase in productivity as the main engine of 
economic growth. The targeted resources shifted from MNCs to global crea-
tive talents and with that, the main policy instruments changed as well. 
However, the essence of the invitation strategy, that of sourcing for needed 
strategic resources from abroad (creative talents in this case) by offering 
Singapore as an attractive business hub remained intact.
The motivation for setting up a business hub is not fundamentally differ-
7) See Lee Kuan Yew 2000. 
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ent from that of a special economic zone (SEZ). The SEZs are designed to 
provide a conducive operational environment to attract businesses (both lo-
cal and MNCs) that the government (local or national or both) is trying to 
promote - businesses that are seen as important to industrialization, export 
growth, employment creation, technology transfer, or other policy 
objectives. The underlying principle is that locating all the firms in the same 
area helps to increase efficiency through economies of scale and agglomer-
ation effects. In transitional economies, keeping the SEZs as enclaves could 
also help shield the rest of the economy from the impact of economic liber-
alization within the zones.
As Zeng (2016) noted, unlike SEZs, which are usually set up as enclaves, a 
business hub is a much looser concept and typically involves a wider area in-
cluding a whole city. Within a large business hub, there could even be mini 
SEZ-like areas designated for the development of specific industrial clusters. 
To be effective, a business hub has to be supported by an adequate provision 
of hard infrastructure and soft infrastructure. Importantly, as Zeng (2016) 
pointed out, a business hub takes time to develop. Only after a great deal of 
trust and a high level of confidence have been built, will the business hub be 
widely accepted by the international business community. This also means 
that it would be difficult to dislodge and replace a business hub, once it is 
successfully established - unless it is ravaged by some catastrophic events. In 
fact, the position of a successful business hub tends to be strengthened over 
time through agglomeration effects. Hence, regional and international busi-
ness hubs like London, New York, Singapore, and Hong Kong remain un-
rivaled today.8)
8) There were such examples in the past.  For example, Lebanon’s position as the business hub 
in the Middle East was destroyed by the civil war in the 1970’s and its position is now argu-
ably replaced by Dubai. Hong Kong’s status as the business hub in Asia was not affected by 
its return to China in 1997 only because the Chinese government had agreed to a “one coun-
try, two systems” policy. Whether Brexit (UK’s exit from the European Union) in 2016 
would prove to be such a monumental event that could undermine London’s global busi-
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What makes Singapore different from some other business hubs in the re-
gion is that it effectively treats the whole world as its hinterland and posi-
tions the whole country as a business hub for the global economy. To over-
come its lack of economic space and resources, Singapore decided early in its 
development to look to the rest of the world not only as the market for the 
goods and services it produces but also as a source of supply of resources it 
needs. The small size of the country makes it easy to apply the business hub 
concept to the whole economy without creating any enclaves. In fact, the 
success story of the Singapore economy is very much a story of how it effec-
tively uses the invitation strategy and leverages on the strengths of other 
economies, to enhance its own productive and innovative capacity. When 
the economy moved from its first growth phase to the second, for example, 
the government simply fine-tuned certain policy instruments to cater to the 
needs of creative talents (instead of MNCs) while preserving the broad 
thrust of the invitation strategy.
Another difference between Singapore and other more conventional busi-
ness hubs is the pragmatic way with which it manages the economy. A cor-
nerstone of any successful business hub lies in the free market, regu-
lation-light environment it provides, with limited interference from the state. 
Yet, Singapore is long known for the strong interventionist stance of the 
government. The intervention takes the form of the usual redistributive policy 
and industrial policy, plus heavy participation of many “government-linked 
companies” (or GLCs, companies that are wholly or majority owned by the 
Singapore government, many of them managed by Temasek Holding, a sov-
ereign wealth fund) that compete directly and aggressively with the private 
sector firms. As Tan and Bhaskaran (2015) noted, “compared with the other 
dynamic Asian economies, government intervention in the economy in 
Singapore is both more intrusive and more extensive.”9) Indeed, the 
ness hub status remains to be seen.  
9) See Tan and Bhaskaran 2015, 53.
158 • Promoting Dynamic & Innovative Growth in Asia: The Cases of Special Economic Zones and Business Hubs
Singapore government takes pride in its ability to make policy changes with-
out being constrained by any ideology. This pragmatic approach has given 
Singapore flexibility to continually redefine and strengthen its position as a 
business hub, as it responds to the changing competitive landscapes in the 
global economy.
This chapter gives an account of how the Singapore economy achieves dy-
namic growth and development and innovation through the invitation strat-
egy and the adaptation of the business hub concept. In Section 2, we discuss 
how Singapore as a business hub succeeded in attracting MNCs to help re-
structure and upgrade the economy and to move up the technological ladder, 
in the first three decades of its development. In Section 3, we extend the dis-
cussion to the period when policy focus shifted to the attraction of creative 
talents instead of MNCs, as the government tried to improve on the coun-
try’s indigenous innovative capacity. Section 4 looks at the critical factors 
that help account for Singapore’s success in implementing the invitation 
strategy and discusses lessons that can be drawn from Singapore’s 
experience. It also addresses some of the downsides that arise from the pur-
suit of the invitation strategy. Section 5 concludes with some thoughts on the 
relevance of the invitation strategy for sustained economic growth and de-
velopment in the long run. 
2. Business Hub for MNCs: 1960s to Late 1990s
For close to 150 years, from 1819 to 1965, Singapore thrived as a free port 
under British colonial rule. The strategic geographical location that it enjoyed 
gave the city-state an edge over other cities as the trading hub of the region. 
Entrepot activities together with the transport, logistics, and financial serv-
ices made up the main pillars of the Singapore economy. To facilitate trading 
activities, the British colonial government put few trade barriers in place. 
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There were also few restrictions on the movement of capital and labor.
When Singapore gained independence from British rule, first as part of the 
Federation of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, and then as an independent state 
since August 1965, policy planners realized that being a regional trading hub 
alone would not be sufficient to provide the depth or the resilience that the 
economy needed for sustained growth in the long run. Like most other new-
ly independent countries at that time, Singapore decided to go for large-scale 
industrialization. But unlike many other countries that did so with the help of 
an import substitution policy, Singapore chose to continue with its free trade 
tradition, focusing instead on export orientation. In the absence of a large 
domestic market, the import substitution policy would not have been 
effective.10) 
Given the limited resources Singapore had at that time, foreign direct in-
vestment through MNCs was seen as a quick and effective way to help the 
country industrialize.11) MNCs brought capital and technology, but im-
portantly they also brought an existing distribution network in the global 
market. To attract the MNCs, the government tried to turn Singapore into 
one of the most, if not the most, efficient business environments in the 
region. By making Singapore a first world city in a third world region, it hop-
ed to provide an oasis for international investors in a region where business 
operations were often hamstrung by myriad regulatory and administrative 
hurdles. This quest for efficiency has been a hallmark of the Singapore econ-
omy, one that has continued to this day. 
A multipronged approach was adopted with a variety of policy instru-
ments being employed to increase Singapore’s appeal to the MNCs. The 
10) Singapore did try import substitution policy for a short time (1963-65) when it was part of 
the Federation of Malaysia comprising Peninsula Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah. 
The attempt failed when Singapore had to exit the federation abruptly in August 1965. 
11) See Goh Keng Swee 2014; Wong and Ng eds. 2001. Indeed, among the four dynamic East 
Asian economies (the so-called Four Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan), Singapore is most dependent on MNCs for economic growth. See Lim 2013.
160 • Promoting Dynamic & Innovative Growth in Asia: The Cases of Special Economic Zones and Business Hubs
government invested strategically in physical and social infrastructure to help 
reduce the operating costs of the business environment; it also made sweep-
ing changes to rules and regulation as well as social policy to facilitate the 
MNCs’ operations. In addition, a special government agency, the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), was set up to market Singapore to MNCs as a 
choice investment location and then to provide one-stop service for the 
MNCs, to help them set up operations in as seamless a way as possible. 
Strategic Investment in “Efficiency Infrastructure”
Like most other business hubs or SEZs, Singapore put in place a wide 
range of conventional fiscal and financial benefits as incentives for the 
MNCs. The Economic Expansion Incentives Act (1967), for instance, grant-
ed “pioneer” status to foreign corporations, with tax benefits for up to five 
years. In most cases, these tax breaks were continually extended in the late 
1970s. Understanding that Singapore needed much more than the conven-
tional tax and financial benefits to differentiate itself from other countries 
wooing the same MNCs, the government invested strategically but heavily in 
physical and social infrastructure that had a huge impact on the efficiency 
and operating costs of the MNCs. It undertook heavy investment in such fa-
cilities as port, airport, logistics, telecommunications, banking, industrial es-
tates, and shipbuilding and repairs to enhance the regional and global con-
nectivity of the city-state - a crucial consideration in the MNCs’ choice of in-
vestment locations. Many of these investments were carried out through 
public sector agencies such as the Port of Singapore Authority, the Public 
Utilities Board, and the Jurong Town Corporation. 
The government also set up numerous government-linked companies to 
help accelerate the investment in “efficiency infrastructure.” The GLCs are 
state-owned enterprises but are expected to be managed according to the 
commercial principles in the private sector, with profit generation being the 
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key driving force. GLCs such as Singapore Telecom (SingTel), Singapore 
Airlines and Neptune Ocean Lines, for example, started out to promote 
Singapore’s connectivity and trade links, while the Development Bank of 
Singapore (now DBS Bank) was established initially as a financing institution 
for development. Even the public sector agencies that were in the business 
of providing public goods or merit goods were encouraged to generate sur-
pluses or at least not to be incurring losses. Many of the GLCs and govern-
ment agencies were later listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange. Some such 
as Singtel have remained among the stock exchange’s largest listed 
companies. 
In addition, the government invested heavily in social infrastructure to 
help MNCs overcome some of the operational challenges, with investment 
in human resource development being among the most important. Various 
vocational training programs were offered through a number of newly set up 
polytechnics and vocational institutes, to help equip the workforce with the 
skills that the MNCs needed. These technical institutes have continued to 
evolve over time, to cater to the changing needs of the MNCs and of the 
economy. To ensure a steady supply of skilled workers to serve the needs of 
the MNCs, the government also leveraged on the training capability of the 
MNCs and assistance from their home governments, by setting up a large 
number of joint training institutes with them.12) 
Changes in Business Rules and Social Policies
In addition to investment in infrastructure, the Singapore government car-
ried out sweeping changes in social policy to help ease the operations of the 
MNCs. The examples below help illustrate its commitment and determi-
12) These include, for instance, Japan-Singapore Technical Institute, Japan-Singapore Training 
Centre, Japan-Singapore Institute of Software Technology, French-Singapore Institute, 
German-Singapore Institute, Philip Government Training Center, Tata-Government 
Training Center, and Rollei-Government Training Center.
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nation to make Singapore a friendly and attractive business hub for MNCs in 
the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Labor Relations
In the 1960s, the militancy of the labor unions and industrial strikes were a 
key deterrence to MNCs in their investment decisions. The Singapore gov-
ernment moved swiftly to enact the Employment Act (1968) and the 
Industrial Relations Amendment Bill (1968) to allay the MNCs’ concerns. 
These legislations severely limit the powers of the Industrial Arbitration 
Court and strengthen management’s rights over the hiring, firing, promo-
tion, and transfer of employees. As Tan and Bhaskaran (2015) noted, the 
new laws cemented government control over the workforce, which became 
more compliant as a result. At the same time, the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) government took drastic measures to break the back of the in-
dependent labor movement and set up a new trade union, the National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), as the only official labor union federation 
in Singapore. Headed by a cabinet minister, NTUC maintains a close and 
symbiotic relationship with the government to help ensure industrial peace 
in the country. 
The impact was felt very quickly. Over the period of 1960 to 1967, a total 
of 1,284,029 man-days were lost as a result of work stoppages. But from 
1978 onward, as the symbiotic relationship between the government and the 
NTUC has continued, there has been virtually no sign of industrial unrest in 
Singapore.13) Over the years, with the support of the NTUC, the govern-
ment has been able to carry out many pro-growth and pro-MNC policies. In 
the 1985 recession, for example, the labor unions agreed to accept a large 
wage cut to help businesses restore competitiveness. 
13) See Tan and Bhaskaran 2015.
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Land Use Policy
Careful planning on the use of industrial land is another critical compo-
nent of the social policy carried out to support the invitation strategy. In 
land-scarce Singapore, land is treated sensitively by the government as a stra-
tegic asset. The allocation of land for industrial and commercial use is care-
fully planned through road maps such as the Concept Plan. First drawn up in 
1971 and reviewed every 10 years, the Concept Plan guides the strategic use 
of land for residential, commercial, and transport purposes. It also provides 
for industrial clustering to reap increasing returns to scale that could help in-
centivize MNCs to operate in Singapore.14) 
Several controversial legislations such as the Land Acquisition Act (1967) 
were used to support what the government considered efficient use of land 
including that of building industrial estates. The Act allowed the government 
to acquire land from individuals at a rate far below the prevailing market pri-
ces, once the land had been gazetted for developmental purposes.15) To help 
incentivize the MNCs in the 1960s and 1970s, EDB, working with the 
Jurong Town Corporation, adopted the “sharing prosperity, sharing misery” 
principle from Japan in leasing industrial land to MNCs and charging them 
for the usage. The principle enabled the MNCs to pay relatively little during 
the first five years of the 30-year land lease and to increase payment in later 
years when the industrial estates and surrounding areas were fully developed 
and their value enhanced. The net result is that MNCs were able to channel 
more of their resources to other operational uses in the initial years.16)
14) See https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/concept-plan.aspx?p1=View-Concept-Plan&p2=Conce
pt-Plan1971.
15) For many years, the compensation was based on the 1973 market price of land without ad-
justment to reflect the changing market value. The law was subsequently amended to align 
the compensation with prevailing market rates. 
16) See Ghesquiere 2007.
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Fighting Corruption
Recognizing the corroding effects corruption had on MNCs operations in 
Singapore, the government tried to root out the problem early. The Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau, a powerful anti-graft agency, was placed di-
rectly under the purview of the prime minister’s office in the early 1960’s to 
give it even more teeth. Strict rules governing the behaviors of the civil serv-
ants were laid down. In a few high-profile cases, cabinet ministers were 
charged and jailed. These events had a strong deterrent effect on the civil 
service. Indeed, for years, Singapore has been consistently ranked among the 
least corrupt countries in the world. In 2014, Singapore was ranked seventh 
out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index. The government also scores well (often in the 99th percentile) in the 
Control of Corruption Index, which reflects perceptions on whether public 
power is being used for private gains.17) 
Language Policy
Another important social policy that the Singapore government in-
troduced in the 1960s was to make English the main official language and 
medium of instruction in schools. The move helped improve the global 
competitiveness of the workforce and eased some of the operational pres-
sures for the MNCs. Yet, it was not a move without controversies. About 75 
percent of the population in Singapore at that time was ethnic Chinese who 
did not take well to the dilution in the use of Chinese language in schools, in-
cluding the closure of a prominent Chinese language university, Nanyang 
University.
One-Stop Service for MNCs
The designation of one single agency to attract and to provide one-stop 
service to the MNCs was an important step that the Singapore government 
17) See figures by Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/country/#SGP.
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took in the early 1960’s. Set up in 1961, the Economic Development Board 
was tasked to persuade MNCs to invest in the city-state and then to help 
them clear various regulatory hurdles, provide them with access to resources 
they needed, and in some cases, grant subsidies to them.18) 
As the chief marketing agency for Singapore, EDB maintains offices in 
major cities in the world that it saw as likely sources of investments targeted 
by Singapore. The New York and Hong Kong offices were among the first 
ones set up in the early 1960s. Compared with other public sector agencies, 
EDB officers are often given more latitude in their marketing campaigns. 
They were also able to enlist the help of political officeholders to help in the 
global marketing efforts. 
To provide effective and comprehensive one-stop service, EDB often en-
listed the help of other government agencies. To get the MNCs to invest in 
the Jurong Industrial Estate in the 1960’s and 1970’s and the Jurong Island 
Petrochemical Hub in the 1990’s, for example, it worked closely with the 
Jurong Town Corporation which took charge of estate development and 
management. EDB has remained the lead agency dealing with the MNCs 
and the coordinating body among the government agencies even as the 
economy evolved over time. 
Examples of how the invitation strategy worked in the first growth phase….
The construction of the Jurong Industrial Estate and the Jurong Island 
Petrochemical Hub provide two examples of how Singapore used the multi-
pronged approach to attract MNCs to help achieve growth and development 
in the first growth phase. The examples also illustrate how the government 
adjusted its policy instruments as the target shifted from labor-intensive to 
18) See Chan 2002. An oft-cited example of the one-stop service was the investment of Texas 
Instruments in the 1960s. Only 50 days elapsed between making the decision to invest and 
commencing the production line in Singapore. See Wong and Singh 2011.
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capital- and technology-intensive industries over time (See Appendix 5-1 and 
Appendix 5-2).
3. Business Hub for Global Creative Talents: From 
Early 2000s to Date
The MNC-driven growth strategy succeeded in helping to transform the 
Singapore economy from a trading hub in the 1960s into a major manu-
facturing hub in the region by the 1980s. It also helped resolve the un-
employment problem that plagued the economy in the 1960s. By early 
1970s, unemployment was no longer an issue. Indeed, except for a few 
short periods, the labor market in the Singapore economy remained tight 
for most parts of the next four decades.19) The benign job market con-
ditions allowed the government to focus on restructuring and upgrading the 
economy, to build up a base for more sustainable growth in the long run. 
Indeed, with sustained and committed efforts on education and training, 
and technology transfer from MNCs, the technical capability of the work-
force rose steadily. 
While the overall GDP growth rate during this period was impressive, the 
sources of growth were not as satisfactory. Various economists have sug-
gested that the Singapore economy appeared to have grown “through per-
spiration rather than inspiration”, and that the bulk of the GDP growth was 
accounted for by capital and labor inputs, not productivity increases.20) 
There have been debates over the actual contribution of productivity growth 
to the GDP growth in Singapore, with many pointing to a disappointing pic-
19) The average unemployment rate from 1992 to 2015 was about 2.4 percent; see statistics from 
Ministry of Manpower at http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/UnemploymentTimeSeries.aspx.
20) See for example, Young 1992; Krugman 1994; and Lim 2013.
Hong Kong’s Business and Financial Hub Development: Factors, Challenges and Policy Implications • 167
ture in the city-state when compared with the other dynamic East Asian 
economies.21) (See Chart 3)
Figure 5-3. Labor Productivity Growth – Asian Dynamic Economies
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Source: Asian Productivity Organization, Productivity Database 2013; Tan and Bhaskaran 2015.
In the early 2000s, the government made a fundamental shift in its growth 
strategy. Recognizing the continual erosion in the efficiency edge it had pre-
viously commanded over other countries in the region and the poor per-
formance of productivity rise as a contributor to GDP growth, it decided to 
shift the policy emphasis to innovation - making it the main driver of growth
- and to target industries characterized by a high rate of innovation and pro-
ductivity increase. In 2003, the Economic Review Committee (ERC) - a gov-
ernment committee tasked to map out the direction for the economy in the 
medium term - identified the following innovation-driven industries to be 
promoted: bioscience, global banking and finance, wealth management, life-
style industries, arts and culture, media and design, education, and health 
care. The focus was reaffirmed in the subsequent medium-term economic 
blueprint, the report of the Economic Strategies Committee (ESC) in 2011. 
21) See IMF 2000.
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The emphasis on innovation-driven growth remains in place today al-
though what are considered crucial industries would likely change over time. 
The new Committee on the Future Economy (CFE), set up in December 
2015, has been charged with identifying industries that would not only add 
value to but also create value for the economy. The CFE is expected to re-
lease its report at end of 2016 although the new targeted industries would 
likely include advanced manufacturing, applied health sciences, smart and 
sustainable urban solutions, logistics, aerospace, and Asian and global financial 
services - industry clusters that Finance Minister Tharman Shammugaratnam 
highlighted in his 2015 budget presentation.22) 
A critical difference between the first and the second growth phase is that, 
in the second growth phase, efficiency of the business environment, while 
necessary, was no longer considered a sufficient condition for the success of 
the invitation strategy. What was deemed crucial was the presence of a crit-
ical mass of creative workers. The implicit assumption seems to be that, in 
innovation-driven industries, firms and investment would flow to where the 
creative workers are, rather than the other way around - workers flowing to 
where the firms are. Thus, instead of equipping the workforce with the skills 
to serve the needs of existing MNCs, it was felt that the city-state should 
build up a creative workforce that could act as a magnet for the MNCs and 
other companies engaging in innovation work. If there was no adequate sup-
ply of creative talents in Singapore, the city-state should look outward to the 
rest of the world. In effect, the invitation strategy was preserved, except that 
the targeted resource to be wooed had shifted from MNCs to creative 
talents.23)
As the targeted resource changed, so did the policy instruments used, 
prompted by an underlying belief that creative talents are driven by motiva-
22) See Budget Statement, Ministry of Finance, Singapore, 2015. See http://www.singaporebu
dget.gov.sg/budget_2015/BudgetSpeech.aspx. 
23) See Tan and Phang 2005.
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tions that are different from those of the professionals and managers work-
ing for MNCs. The quality of the living and the working environment mat-
ters, as do the lifestyles. To attract these talents, it was thought that 
Singapore needed to provide not only a conducive environment for in-
novation work, but also lifestyles that were available in other global cosmo-
politan cities such as London, New York, or Boston.24) Indeed, a consistent 
theme in both the ERC (2003) and the ESC (2010) reports was the emphasis 
on making Singapore “a leading global city, a hub of talent, enterprise and in-
novation” and “the most open and cosmopolitan city in Asia, and one of the 
best places to live and work in.”25)
Just as it did in the 1960s and 1970s, the government employed a multi-
pronged approach to effect the necessary changes. New fiscal incentives 
were unveiled, while new physical and social investments were made and 
new rules and social norms adopted to effect the changes. The EDB, togeth-
er with other government agencies, were tasked to market Singapore to glob-
al creative talents and to facilitate their moves to Singapore. 
Strategic Investment in “Innovation Infrastructure”
A wide range of fiscal and financial incentives were offered to individuals 
and firms that were considered parts of the innovation-driven industries. 
The generous incentives offered to the bioscience and the wealth manage-
ment industries are two such examples (See Appendix 5-3 and Appendix 
5-4). In addition to continued investment in “efficiency infrastructure,” the 
government also started investing heavily in “innovation infrastructure” -
physical and social infrastructures that make Singapore a more conducive en-
vironment for innovation activities. The intellectual property rights laws 
were significantly strengthened with the setting up of supporting facilities 
24) The Singapore government’s thinking appears to be consistent with what Richard Florida 
advocated in his thesis on the creative class. See Florida 2002.
25) See Report of the ERC 2003, Chapter 4: 51-60, and Report of the ESC, 2011: 7-10.
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such as the IP Academy Singapore. 
The government also substantially stepped up the spending on research 
and development (R&D) to scale up such activities. Between 2003 and 2013, 
the gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose by a com-
pound annual growth rate of 8.2 percent, from $3.4 billion to $7.6 billion. 
Meanwhile, the R&D Manpower (including researchers, postgraduate students, 
technicians and support staff) grew from 28,825 persons to 47,275 persons, 
whereas the number of researchers (excluding postgraduate students) in-
creased from 19,448 to 34,373 during the same decade.26)
Rules and regulations related to starting up and doing business in 
Singapore were relaxed. For example, the Land Intensification Allowance 
implemented in 2010 gives recipients tax allowances to facilitate the in-
tensification of industrial land use toward more efficient and higher val-
ue-adding activities. The Headquarters Programme provides incentives that 
encourage companies to set up regional bases in Singapore.27) These meas-
ures have helped make Singapore one of the easiest places to do business in 
the world. (See Table 5-1)
Table 5-1. WEF Competitiveness and World Bank Ease of Doing Business 
Rankings ( Top 10 Economies, 2015-16)
Country 
WEF “Overall 
Competitiveness” 
WEF “Infrastructure 
Competitiveness”
World Bank “Ease of 
Doing Business”
Singapore 2 2 1
Switzerland 1 6 20
United States 3 11 7
Germany 4 7 14
Netherlands 5 3 27
26) See “National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2013,” A*STAR, December 2014.
27) See https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/why-singapore/ready-to-invest/incentives-
for-businesses.html.
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 Table 5-1. Continued
Country 
WEF “Overall 
Competitiveness” 
WEF “Infrastructure 
Competitiveness”
World Bank “Ease of 
Doing Business”
Japan 6 5 19
Hong Kong 
SAR
7 1 3
Finland 8 25 9
Sweden 9 20 11
United 
Kingdom
10 9 8
Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 2015-16; World Bank “Ease of Doing 
Business;” 2015.
The education and training system was twisted to place more emphasis on 
creativity and innovation. A new university, the Singapore Management 
University (in collaboration with the Wharton School in the United States) 
was set up in early 2000s to offer a more innovative pedagogical approach 
than those at the other two established universities. A fourth university, the 
Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD, in collaboration 
with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Zhejiang University) 
was founded in 2009 to provide more creativity- and innovation-based 
programs. Greater emphasis was also placed on the education of the arts, 
away from the traditional focus on science and engineering. A new high 
school, School of the Arts, was set up, with considerable state subsidies, to 
produce artists and graduates who could contribute to the arts and the media 
businesses. Foreign universities such as the Tisch School of the Arts were in-
vited to set up campuses to provide tertiary education programs that were 
not available in Singapore. 
The economic impetus of these shifts may be seen in the following state-
ment from the former Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong. In an interview 
with the Asia News Network in May 2002, he noted, “For many years, we 
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concentrated on the economic side. But if you want the economic side to 
flourish, you need more entrepreneurs, you need more creativity. So, you 
must also look at the arts. The two must go together”. 28)
Changes in Business Rules and Social Policies
One of the biggest policy changes to support the new growth strategy - a 
change whose repercussion is still being felt in the economy today - was the 
massive relaxation of rules on immigration and foreign workers, to help 
bring in a large number of creative talents, entrepreneurs, and high-income 
professionals who would fit in with the innovation-driven growth vision. A 
new class of employment pass, the S-Pass, was introduced to bring in for-
eigners who were deemed to have entrepreneurial potential. New incentives 
were also rolled out to attract high-net-worth individuals, who were seen as 
important for wealth-creating activities in the economy. The result was 
immediate. Between 2005 and 2013, the size of the non-resident workforce 
rose 101.6 percent while the population rose more than 20 percent to over 
five million - a staggering change in a small city-state of about 719 square 
kilometers.29)  (See Chart 4)
28) See Chapter 1, Report of the ERCt, 2003. https://www.mti.gov.sg/ResearchRoom/
Documents/.../ERC_SVS_CRE_Chapter1.pdf.
29) Source: SingStat.
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Figure 5-4. Singapore Population Size (thousands)
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From the early 2000s onward, foreigners were increasingly appointed to 
senior positions in the government and the GLCs, including positions that 
were previously considered “sensitive” such as the deputy managing director 
of the central bank; CEO of the Singapore Stock Exchange; CEO of DBS, 
one of the largest banks in Singapore and CEO of Neptune Orient Lines, the 
national shipping line. 
Attempts were also made to bring back talented Singaporeans who were 
working and living abroad. Initiatives such as “Singapore Connect” and 
“Majulah Singapura” were launched to connect overseas Singaporeans with 
entities in Singapore. An annual “Singapore Day” event was started in major 
cities to bring Singaporeans living in these cities together and to help show-
case Singapore as a choice location for work and residence.
There were also attempts to promote entrepreneurship among 
Singaporeans. The government set up various investment funds to encour-
age venture capital and private equity investments such as a US$1 billion 
Technopreneurship Investment Fund in the late 1990s. A junior minister 
was tasked to lead a number of campaigns in the early 2000’s to encourage 
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more Singaporeans to become entrepreneurs although many of these cam-
paigns appear to have fallen flat.30) 
In an effort to change the “nanny state” image of Singapore, the govern-
ment also tried to allow for a freer and more diverse lifestyle and to make the 
city-state a more exciting place.31) Large amount of public funds were ex-
pended to “make over” the city, to offer lifestyles similar to those in other 
global cities. These include an extensive facelift for the urban landscape and 
construction of various iconic projects including the Esplanade (a 
state-of-the-art performing center), Gardens by the Bay (a large seaside trop-
ical garden), two Integrated Resorts (casinos), and other cultural landmarks. 
The city also started aggressively to bid for the rights to host global enter-
tainment events such as F1 (night car racing), sports events (major tennis 
and golf tournaments), and world-class arts and entertainment 
performances.
One-Stop Service
Working with different government agencies, the EDB continued to play 
the role of marketing agent and one-stop service provider, to attract creative 
talents (and firms) working in innovation-driven industries. For example, in 
the Global Schoolhouse and the World Class University programs - ini-
tiatives aimed at transforming Singapore into an educational hub - EDB 
teamed up with Singapore Tourism Board, Spring Singapore (the agency in 
charge of developing enterprises especially the small and medium-sized en-
terprises, or SMEs, within Singapore), IE Singapore (the agency tasked with 
helping Singapore companies to expand overseas), and the Ministry of 
30) See, for example, various initiatives of business networks launched in early 2000s by the 
then minister of state for trade and industry.
31) There were attempts, for example, to allow for a more relaxed approach toward the LGBT 
community even in the civil service. A Speaker’s Corner was set up for Singaporeans to air 
their views on political and social issues, in the same fashion as the Hyde Park in London; 
there were debates about allowances for bar-top dancing and so forth.
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Education. (See Appendix 5-5: Global Schoolhouse Program) 
Examples of invitation strategy in the second growth phase…
The bioscience and the wealth management industries are two examples 
of the innovation-driven industries that the government tried to promote in 
the second growth phase. The rapid growth of these two industries was in 
large part a result of the multipronged approach that the government 
employed. Both cases show that while the broad thrust of the invitation 
strategy had been retained in the second growth phase, the policy instru-
ments used were different, targeted at individual workers rather than firms. 
(See Appendix 5-3 and Appendix 5-4)
4. The Singapore Experience: Success Factors 
and Lessons
By positioning the city-state as an attractive business hub and relying on 
the inflows of external resources such as MNCs and global creative talents to 
drive the growth and development of the economy, the invitation strategy 
seems to have worked well for Singapore over the past 50 years. In the first 
growth phase, the presence of MNCs helped transform the economy, up-
grade the production structure, and raise the income level of the workforce. 
This allowed the economy to grow at a much faster pace than the other three 
Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan). The creative talent 
driven growth strategy over the past 15 years appears to have been successful 
too, at least at the macro level. The economy grew on average by 5.4 percent 
a year from 2000 to 2014, an impressive record for a mature economy. (See 
Chart 5)
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Figure 5-5. GDP Growth in Asian Tiger Economies 1980-2014 (% yoy)
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The policy has also significantly changed the country’s industry landscape, 
generally in line with the government’s vision. The contribution of the serv-
ices sector rose to 67 percent of GDP in 2014 compared with 61 percent in 
2000, a significant part of it being in exportable services. New industries that 
the government set out to promote such as pharmaceuticals (and life scien-
ces in particular), education, health care, engineering services, logistics in-
dustries have significantly increased their presence in the economy. Together 
some of these “developing” industries now account for close to 20% of 
GDP. (See Table 5-2) The new growth strategy has also changed the face of 
the Singapore society. The city in 2016 is much more cosmopolitan, and of-
fers a much more diverse lifestyle than in 2000.32) 
32) While detail statistics on the population profile are not available, anecdotal evidence points 
to a much more diverse society, racially and culturally, today than 15 years ago. For exam-
ple, according to the Philippines census data, the number of Filipinos working in Singapore 
over the decade 2003-13 tripled to about 167,000.
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Table 5-2. Changing GDP Contributions of New Industries
GDP Contribution (%)
Industry Sector 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Biomedical and Healthcare Services 3.9 3.3 4.1 4.7 3
Chemical 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2
Clean Technology 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Education 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Electronics 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4
Engineering Services 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
Food and Beverage 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Food Manufacturing 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Logistics 5.1 5 4.8 5 5.2
Marine and Offshore Engineering 2 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7
Precision Engineering 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.2
Note: Chemical industry cluster as defined by SPRING excludes Petroleum & Petrochemicals Educati
on industry cluster as defined by SPRING, excludes Non-Profit Organisations, includes child 
care services for pre-school children Electronics cluster as defined by SPRING excludes Data 
Storage and Semiconductor Manufacturing.
Success Factors for Singapore
Singapore’s experience has validated a number of conventional wisdoms 
about the preconditions needed for a successful business hub. As Zeng 
(2016a) noted, such preconditions include, among others, a strategic geo-
graphical location that offers global connectivity; an adequate provision of 
infrastructure that helps facilitate business operations within the hub; sup-
portive government policies and regulations for businesses and individuals 
including the provision of one-stop services for new and existing businesses; 
a business-friendly culture embracing international best practices; and an ad-
equate supply of the required manpower. Singapore was able to meet these 
preconditions effectively early in its development.
What makes Singapore different from other successful business hubs in 
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the world such as London and Hong Kong is the heavy involvement of the 
government in fulfilling these preconditions. The Singapore government is 
intimately involved in designing and managing the business hub. Not only 
does it set the broad direction for the growth and development of the busi-
ness hub and build the necessary infrastructures to support such develop-
ment; it also intervenes directly through industrial policy to shape the pro-
duction structure within the business hub. As we discuss below, the govern-
ment’s hands were visible in almost every aspect of the endeavours to build 
up and maintain Singapore as a regional business hub.
Global Connectivity 
The importance of a strategic geographical location and global con-
nectivity cannot be overemphasized. Singapore is situated at the heart of 
Southeast Asia and the crossroads between Indian Ocean and the Pacific 
Ocean, right at the tip of the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest 
transport and trading routes. What is more important, however, is 
Singapore’s ability to build on the natural geographical advantage to maintain 
and enhance its global connectivity. This is accomplished through con-
tinuous investment over the years, largely by the government, in strategic in-
frastructure such as telecommunications; the transport system including sea, 
air, and land transport; the logistics and distribution network; and the finan-
cial service facilities. For many years, Singapore has continued to rank highly 
in efficient infrastructure provision globally. (See Table 5-1 above) 
Singapore also benefited from the long tradition of free trade and free 
movement of capital and labor it had under British colonial rule. The culture 
of openness helped ease the implementation of many policies aimed at at-
tracting foreign investment and foreign workers. This advantage was re-
inforced over the years by a careful and pragmatic approach toward foreign 
relations policy. As Tan and Bhaskaran (2015) noted, to ensure continued ac-
cess to its “global hinterland,” Singapore has to maintain a close and yet neu-
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tral tie with as many countries as possible. Often this calls for delicate bal-
ancing in dealing with its major economic partners. Singapore’s handling of 
China and the United States, two rival powers contending for influence in 
Asia, is a good example. The city-state’s ability to reach free trade agreements 
with so many countries is in part a testament of its success in managing inter-
national diplomacy.33) 
Provision of Strategic Infrastructure
To maintain Singapore’s business hub status, the government has con-
tinued to invest heavily in both soft and hard infrastructures that matter to 
the resources it tries to attract and retain. More importantly, it is willing and 
able to adjust its investment instruments as its policy objectives and the type 
of strategic resources it needs change. In the second growth phase, for exam-
ple, in addition to continuing the investment in efficiency infrastructure, it 
substantially stepped up investment in numerous innovation infrastructures. 
It also shifted the policy focus to cater more to the needs of individual crea-
tive workers than those of MNCs per se. This shift took place across the 
whole spectrum of government policy including changes in business rules 
and regulations, in education and employment policies and in incentive 
structures for new targeted industries.
Supply of Relevant Human Resources
A pro-active and forward-looking manpower and education policy, to-
gether with a very liberal policy on foreign worker inflows, contribute sig-
nificantly to the success of the invitation strategy. Education consistently 
makes up the second largest spending in the annual budget, after defense, 
33) As of the end of 2015, Singapore has signed 20 free trade agreements with 31 countries, 
with seven more still being negotiated, making it one of the most active countries in the 
pursuit of free trade. Singapore also plays an important role in promoting region wide free 
trade agreements such as the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement), the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
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amounting to $12.8billion (or 18.71% of the budget) in 2016. The education 
system (mainly public education) by and large has been able to respond to 
the changing demands for skills. Meanwhile, the liberal policy on foreign 
worker inflows helps plug many of the remaining skills gaps in the economy.
In the first growth phase, for example, the education system, with its 
strong emphasis on science, engineering, technical and vocational training, 
was geared towards supplying the MNCs with the skilled labor they needed. 
As the economy moved into the innovation-driven growth phase, the gov-
ernment began to redesign the education programs at the tertiary level, and 
increasingly at the primary and secondary level as well, to develop a mindset 
of creativity, adaptability and agility. The massive liberalization of the rules 
on immigration and foreign workers in the mid-2000’s brought in the re-
quired manpower that the education system was not able to produce in time.
Pro-active manpower planning remains an essential component of the in-
vitation strategy. In 2015, for instance, the government set up a number of 
sectoral tripartite committees (STC), one for each key sector in the economy, 
to help map out the sectoral manpower plans (SMP) for these sectors. In ad-
dition to projecting the sectors’ future growth paths, the SMPs are to identify 
the manpower and skills needs of the sectors, as well as policy measures 
needed to provide an adequate supply of skilled workers in each sector.34) To 
help ensure the relevance of the plans, key stakeholders in each sector have 
been invited to participate in the planning exercises: each STC is chaired by a 
government agency assigned to champion the sector and supported by em-
ployers and workers’ unions.
Livability of the Business Hub
A critical success factor for Singapore as a business hub is its ability to 
maintain the city-state’s position not only as a choice location for work but 
34) See http://business.asiaone.com/news/first-industries-get-sectoral-manpower-plans-ide
ntified.
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also as a desirable place of residence. This was an essential part of the in-
vitation strategy from the beginning, and it took on even greater importance 
in the second growth phase when policy measures were targeted increasingly 
at individual workers. The underlying premise here appears to be that the liv-
ability of a city has a significant bearing on a company’s decision to stay in or 
to move out of the city. Thus even in the 1960s and 1970s, the government 
made conscious efforts to present Singapore as an “oasis” to work and live 
in. For many years, the prime minister led the greening of the city campaign 
with an annual tree planting day and took personal interests in the work of 
the National Parks Board, which took charge of the construction and main-
tenance of parks and gardens. Efforts were also made to provide other social 
and recreational amenities seen as important to the expatriate community, 
including allocating a significant amount of land to build golf courses in a se-
verely land-scarce city. 
Livability became a paramount concern for policy makers as Singapore 
shifted into the second growth phase and positioned itself to be a global city. 
In addition to the emphasis on the livability of the physical environment, the 
government tried to change the social and cultural milieu to increase 
Singapore’s appeal to the global creative talents. It also tried to appeal to the 
sense of belonging and ownership among the foreign talents working in 
Singapore. Regular attempts were made to persuade them to take up perma-
nent residence or citizenship in the country while senior managers of MNCs 
were often included in national committees set up to chart new directions 
for the economy or the society. 
Close Coordination among Government Agencies to Provide One-Stop Service
Close coordination among different government agencies is another fac-
tor that contributes to Singapore’s success in attracting and providing 
one-stop service to the MNCs and global creative talents. While EDB has 
been the lead agency in this regard, it is not the only one. Depending on the 
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industry being promoted, other agencies would be roped in to help. For ex-
ample, JTC played a major role in the development of the Jurong Industrial 
Estate and the Jurong Island Petrochemical Hub. In the One North project, 
EDB worked closely with both JTC and A*STAR. In the Global 
Schoolhouse program, a number of other agencies including Singapore 
Tourism Board, IE Singapore, Spring Singapore and the Ministry of 
Education were involved. 
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s, close inter-agency coordination also helped 
bring MNCs to industrial estates that Singapore had built offshore with oth-
er host countries including the Growth Triangle (comprising Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia) and the Suzhou Industrial Park in China. These ef-
forts were aimed at building an external wing for the Singapore economy and 
cementing Singapore’s position as a regional headquarters and business hub 
for MNCs that invest in the Asia-Pacific region. 
“Winner Picking” to Shape the Industry Landscape in the Business Hub
Recognizing that the value of a business hub depends to large extent on 
the value added of the industries that it serves, the Singapore government 
has been actively engaging in “picking winners,” identifying and promoting 
what it considers to be promising growth industries. Indeed, a major task of 
the various national economic strategy committees mentioned above (such 
as the ERC, the ESC and the CFE) is to help review and redefine 
Singapore’s comparative advantage and to recommend new growth in-
dustries for the city-state. Once identified, these industries usually receive 
strong support from the government, which acts not only as a facilitator 
(providing specific conditions to help the industries succeed) but often as a 
funder or direct investor as well, through investments carried out by the stat-
utory boards or the GLCs. 
To ensure the relevance of the chosen industries and other policy ini-
tiatives, the Singapore government has over the years established various 
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mechanisms, at industry level, to facilitate regular consultations between the 
government and the private sector. The national economic strategy commit-
tees, for example, typically include representatives from the government, the 
private sector, labor unions, and other stakeholders in the economy. In addi-
tion, the government often includes representatives from the MNCs as well 
as individual foreigners in these committees, so that their voices and con-
cerns are represented.
Lessons from Singapore’s Experience
The main lesson from Singapore’s experience is not that it has helped vali-
date a number of conventional wisdoms about the preconditions needed in a 
successful business. It is that the government can be the key driving force in 
satisfying these preconditions. As Zeng (2016b) pointed out, a successful 
business hub is not built overnight. It needs to demonstrate its credibility 
and win the confidence of the businesses over time. This requires a sustained 
period of policy rationality and consistency on the part of the government. 
Singapore’s experience shows that this can be done.
Many commentators have likened the government’s management of the 
economy to that of running a corporate enterprise, with the bottom line (the 
GDP growth rate in this case) and the strategy (attraction of MNCs and cre-
ative talents) clearly defined.35) Indeed, this corporate-like approach to man-
aging the economy and the business hub has been a major reason accounting 
for the government’s effectiveness in implementing the invitation strategy. 
The MNCs and the global creative talents are treated by the government al-
most like “business clients” to be won over. Other developmental objectives 
are often subordinated to the pursuit of MNCs and global talents. 
35) Reflecting such a corporate orientation in managing the economy, the prime minister and 
the cabinet ministers appear to liken themselves to the chief executive and senior execu-
tives in a corporate entity, with their remunerations (including a large component of yearly 
bonus) determined partly by the achievement of the bottom-line (the GDP growth rate) 
and pegged to the top earners in the private sector. See Tan and Bhaskaran 2015.
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Furthermore, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3 above, other economic and 
noneconomic policies often have to be adjusted to accommodate the pursuit 
of MNCs and global talents. Discussion of distributive equity issues such as 
the relative shares of GDP between employers and employees, between 
MNCs and local firms, and so on, is generally encouraged as it could distract 
the government from the pursuit of GDP growth. Likewise, advocacy of is-
sues such as labor rights, a minimum wage law, or job protection for 
Singaporeans over foreigners is often frown upon as it is seen to have the 
potential of deterring the inflows of MNCs and foreign talents and slow 
GDP growth. 
If the government takes a relentless approach in pursuing the bottom line, 
there is nevertheless a large element of pragmatism and flexibility in its man-
agement of the business hub and the economy. In fact, the Singapore gov-
ernment takes pride in its ability to respond to external changes without be-
ing bounded by any ideology. A good example is the government’s decision 
in the early 2000s to allow casinos to be set up, after many years of strong 
objection. The two casinos, to be built as part of the “integrated resorts” that 
offer a wide range of MICE facilities (for meetings, incentives, conferences, 
and exhibitions) were seen not only as an important source of GDP growth, 
but more importantly, as a critical element of the effort to re-brand 
Singapore as a global city. In the government’s calculation, the potential eco-
nomic contribution of the casinos outweighed their potential adverse social 
impact. Meanwhile, to help mitigate the adverse social impact, a number of 
practical measures were implemented: an agency was set up to provide coun-
seling to gambling addicts, and, as a form of deterrence, a fee of S$100 was 
imposed on any Singaporean who visits the casinos. This pragmatic open-
ness to new ideas and new policy instruments has helped the city-state main-
tain its business hub status over the years.
Can the Singapore experience be replicated in other cities? The answer is 
at most a qualified yes. Singapore’s chosen approach is a reflection of its 
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unique economic circumstances which may not be shared by other business 
hubs. The heavy and active government intervention in designing and man-
aging the business hub stems in part from the fact that there is no distinction 
between Singapore the business hub and Singapore the economy. The whole 
economy is managed as a business hub, unlike other business hubs that 
might exist either as an enclave or as a city with a large hinterland. Failure of 
the business hub means failure of the whole economy. Viewed from that 
perspective, it is not surprising that the Singapore government felt the need 
to have a strong influence over the direction and pace of development of the 
business hub as the outcome affects the entire population. 
Singapore also differs from other business hubs in that it appears to run 
the business hub mainly to attract foreign resources (MNCs and global tal-
ents). This is the essence of the invitation strategy. For many years, the gov-
ernment has paid relatively less attention to the needs of local companies, es-
pecially the SMEs. Among the Four Asian Tigers, Singapore has been the 
most dependent on MNCs and foreign workers to drive its economic 
growth. This focus on foreign resources allows the government to design 
policy without being distracted by the conflicting interests between the local 
and the foreign businesses or workers. That is a luxury that business hubs 
elsewhere may not enjoy.
Ultimately what allows the Singapore government to pursue the invitation 
strategy with such single-mindedness is the strong political mandate it enjoys 
and the implicit social contract it seems to be able to maintain with the peo-
ple over the years. In return for strong economic growth and rising living 
standards, Singaporeans appear to be willing to accept the near complete 
dominance of the ruling People’s Action Party in parliament, giving it a free 
hand in managing the economy. Since the early 1970s, the PAP has con-
sistently won over 60 percent of the popular votes in every election. Under 
the Westminster first-past-the-post election system, the opposition has been 
able to secure only a handful of seats in the parliament despite the nearly 40 
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percent of popular support it receives at the polls. In the current parliament, 
the opposition occupies only six of the 89 seats. The near monopoly of the 
ruling party allows it to adopt policy measures that it deems to be in the 
long-term interest of the economy, even if they are unpopular in the short 
run. It also allows the government to put the attraction of MNCs and foreign 
workers above other developmental objectives even if this results in un-
happiness among some segments of Singaporeans. 
To be sure, the government does take a calibrated approach in managing 
such social contracts--another manifestation of its pragmatism. At times 
when the level of unhappiness appears to be high, the government has 
shown itself willing to step back somewhat from the relentless pursuit of 
GDP growth, to accommodate the dissenting voices. This could be seen, for 
example, in its response to the setback it suffered in the 2011 general 
election. The decline in the popular support it received then was widely at-
tributed to the massive influx of new immigrants and foreign workers - a key 
component of the innovation-driven growth strategy - which was in turn 
seen to be the main cause of a number of social and economic problems 
such as wage and income stagnation, congestion and increased social 
tensions. Immediately after the election, the government began to moderate 
the pace of foreign worker inflows. Indeed, while the total number of the 
non-resident workers continued to grow, the growth rate dropped from an 
average of 11.1% per annum in 2006-2010 to 1.7% per annum in 2010-201
5.36)
Challenges for Singapore
Though successful in many ways, the Singapore approach is not without 
problems. If a large part of Singapore’s success as a business hub could be at-
tributed to the government’s policy, so could many of the problems that it 
36) See statistics from the Ministry of Manpower in http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Labour-F
orce-In-Singapore-2015.aspx.
Hong Kong’s Business and Financial Hub Development: Factors, Challenges and Policy Implications • 187
faced over the years. As the city-state moves to the next stage of its develop-
ment, the limits of the invitation strategy and the challenges confronting 
Singapore are becoming more obvious. In fact, the root causes of many of 
these challenges can be traced to the invitation strategy that Singapore has 
pursued over the past 50 years. 
As noted earlier, “picking winners” is an integral part of the invitation 
strategy: the government decides which industries to promote and therefore 
what types of MNCs and global talents to invite. The success of these in-
dustries in turn could determine the success of Singapore as a business hub. 
But, as in any winner-picking strategy, there would be both successes and 
disappointments. The promotion of the petrochemical industry and the 
wealth management industry, for example, has been viewed as success 
stories. But the same may not be said of other initiatives such as the Global 
Schoolhouse program. A number of earlier attempts by the government to 
build up an external wing for the economy by investing in similar business 
hubs “offshore” did not turn out well either. Views about the success of the 
Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park, a large-scale industrial cum residential es-
tate in China, for instance, remain mixed at best.37) 
Two challenges that Singapore faces today, the absence of an adequate in-
digenous production capacity and the weak innovative capacity, are proving 
to be particularly daunting. Both challenges could be attributed directly to 
the pursuit of the invitation strategy.
Weak Indigenous Production Capacity
Years of heavy reliance on the MNCs has contributed to a lack of ad-
equate indigenous production capacity in Singapore. Singapore’s indigenous 
GDP (percentage of GDP accruing to resident citizens and PRs, and local 
companies) has been falling consistently over the past three decades, from 
over 70% in late 1980’s to less than 60% by 2010.38) In particular, SMEs 
37) See Zeng 2016a.
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have not been able to play as vital a role in the innovation and growth of the 
economy as those in other dynamic East Asian economies or industrialized 
economies such as Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. Policy 
support and government incentives are seen to have favored heavily the 
MNCs (and the GLCs to some extent) in the past. 
As various commentators have pointed out, Singapore has for decades 
suffered from a two-track economic structure: a competitive export-oriented 
sector dominated by MNCs and a less competitive domestically oriented sec-
tor comprising mainly SMEs.39) As Tan and Bhaskaran (2015) noted, 
Singapore’s export-oriented manufacturing ecosystem consists largely of for-
eign-owned MNCs with local SMEs making up only the supporting industry. 
Few Singaporean SMEs, whether in manufacturing or services, have been 
able to grow to become globally competitive giants. The failure to tap into 
the opportunities provided by the region, including the 10-member 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) grouping that collectively 
presents a bigger market than India, is particularly glaring. 
While such a lack of indigenous production capacity is not necessarily in-
consistent with the pursuit of the invitation strategy - the business hub status 
is not affected by the ownership structure of the companies based in 
Singapore - it nevertheless points to a worrying trend in the long run. Given 
the mobility of many MNCs and foreign talents, it is not clear how sustain-
able Singapore’s position as a regional business hub can be without a suffi-
ciently large core of local production capacity.
To be sure, the government in recent years has begun to address these 
issues. A number of new schemes, including financing schemes, have been 
rolled out to help increase the competitiveness and the regional reach of the 
38) See Manu Bhaskaran, “Singapore: Economic Outlook – Challenges to the Economic Model,” 
presentation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Mar 31, 2015 in http://lkyspp.nu
s.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Productivity-challenges-in-Singapore-Part-4.pdf.
39) See Hawyee Auyong 2015.
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SMEs.40) Significantly, the EDB appears to be signalling a change in its strat-
egy as well. Instead of focusing primarily on attracting MNCs and creative 
talents to Singapore, it has indicated a shift towards helping Singapore-based 
companies to grow by tapping into the regional markets, with the goal of 
transforming some of them into billion-dollar businesses.41)
Weak Indigenous Innovative Capacity
Despite the massive efforts to rebalance the composition of growth and to 
make innovation and productivity increase the major source of GDP growth 
in Singapore - it being the primary policy objective of the innovation-driven 
growth phase over the past 15 years - the results have not been encouraging. 
Productivity growth in the city-state in recent years has performed poorly 
when compared with other dynamic East Asian economies. (See Chart 2 
above) In some years, the contribution to GDP growth was actually 
negative.42) The poor performance in productivity growth suffers from the 
two-tier economic structure noted earlier - productivity growth of the do-
mestically oriented local companies (which employ more than 60% of the 
workforce) generally lags that of the export-oriented MNCs. This could in 
turn be explained in part by the insufficient attention paid to the state of in-
digenous innovation over the decades.43)  
Singapore did not have a comprehensive national policy to promote in-
digenous innovation until the late 1990s. As Wong and Singh (2011) noted, 
from 1960s until the late 1980s, the government policy mainly focused on 
technology transfer from MNCs to local supporting industries and technol-
ogy deepening of the latter. The first National Technology Plan was for-
mulated as recently as 1990 with the establishment of the National Science 
and Technology Board (later renamed A*STAR, for Agency for Science, 
40) See Tan and Gan 2012.
41) See “EDB’s new job: Create billion-dollar businesses,” Straits Times, May 28, 2016.
42) See discussion in Tan and Bhaskaran 2015.
43) See Auyong Hawyee 2015.
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Technology, and Research). The plan, however, targeted mostly applied 
R&D to support MNCs in critical industrial clusters and made little effort to 
build up an indigenous R&D system and basic research.
More serious efforts to promote indigenous innovation and R&D in tar-
geted industries started only in the early 2000s as the economy shifted into 
the second growth phase. Policy makers began to look into the possibilities 
of developing innovative capabilities of SMEs, promoting basic R&D capa-
bilities, technology commercialization, and high-tech entrepreneurship. The 
government also made substantial investments in R&D in a few selected in-
dustries such as life sciences, environmental and water technology, and inter-
active and digital media technology. In 2006, the National Research 
Foundation was set up to coordinate major R&D activities in the country in-
cluding funding, enhancing linkages between R&D and commercialization, 
and the like. Furthermore, as part of its efforts to promote entrepreneurship, 
the government started to relax rules and regulations governing the business 
environment including rules on start-up businesses, bankruptcy, and stock 
market listing requirements. It also tried to promote the growth of venture 
capital and private equity funds and to strengthen the intellectual property 
rights with new legislations and the establishment of the IP Academy.
The government has persisted in its efforts to boost innovation and pro-
ductivity growth in recent years. There is also increased emphasis on the par-
ticipation of local firms and local talents. Over the past two years, for in-
stance, a number of new major projects have been launched to raise the pro-
ductivity at work places and to enhance the quality of life through greater use 
of ICT technology (The Smart Nation Initiative and the Industry 
Transformation Programme), to support R&D and innovation in some pri-
ority industry clusters like advanced manufacturing and engineering, health 
and biomedical sciences, urban solutions and sustainability, and services and 
digital economy (The Research Innovation Enterprise 2020 Plan), and to 
raise the productivity in selected sectors like health care, construction, manu-
Hong Kong’s Business and Financial Hub Development: Factors, Challenges and Policy Implications • 191
facturing, and logistics sectors.44)
The efforts over the past 15 year have helped raise Singapore’s profile in 
innovation. As Auyong (2015) noted, Singapore’s GERD adjusted for the 
size of the GDP is now consistent with that of the developed economies. In 
2015, Singapore ranked 7th overall in the Global Innovation Index. What is 
disconcerting, however, is the seeming inability of the city-state to convert 
the large inputs into actual innovation. In the Global Innovation Index 2014, 
Singapore was placed 110th out of 143 economies in “Innovation 
Efficiency”,45) while a separate Asia-centric study ranked Singapore 8th out 
of 22 Asian economies in “Creative Productivity.” Specifically Singapore’s 
use of creative inputs has been found to be inefficient relative to countries 
like Japan, Hong Kong, China and New Zealand.46) The less than sat-
isfactory performance in innovation and productivity growth points to the 
need to re-examine the relevance of the policy instruments used not only for 
the enhancement of indigenous innovative capacity, but also fir the pursuit 
of the innovation-driven growth strategy. More fundamentally, it calls for a 
critical review of the appropriate role for the government in promoting in-
novation vis-à-vis efficiency.  
44) See the Singapore 2016 Budget Speech, http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/data/budget
_2016/download/FY2016_Budget_Statement.pdf; and reports in http://www.channelne
wsasia.com/news/business/singapore/govt-commits-s-19b-to-new/2409426.html.
45) See World Innovation Index 2014, WIPO, pg xxiv.
46) See Creative Productivity Index: Analysing creativity nd innovation in Asia, EIU, August 
2014, pg 5 cited in Auyong, 2015.
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5. Conclusion 
Singapore’s experience over the past 50 years has shown that a small 
city-state without any meaningful hinterland or natural resources could suc-
ceed in achieving sustained and robust economic growth while continually 
transforming and upgrading its industry structure. By positioning the 
city-state as an efficient business hub, first for MNCs and later for creative 
talents, Singapore has been able to leverage the resources of other countries 
to ride on the waves of various growth industries over time. It has provided a 
unique case study of the invitation strategy for economic growth and 
development.
While Singapore’s experience has validated a number of conventional wis-
doms about what makes a successful business hub and the preconditions re-
quired for such success, it has above all highlighted the important role that 
government could play in bringing about such success. The Singapore gov-
ernment has been at the forefront of providing the preconditions that the 
city-state needs to succeed as a business hub: global connectivity, availability 
of hard and soft infrastructures, an adequate supply of relevant manpower, 
business-friendly regulations, and openness to international best practices, 
among others. Its effectiveness in delivering such preconditions stems large-
ly from a pragmatic yet bottom-line-driven approach in policy making and 
governance. While relentless in its pursuit of the invitation strategy, it is nev-
ertheless willing to adjust its policy instruments as external circumstances 
change. The consistency with which it has adopted the approach has allowed 
Singapore to win the confidence of international investors and businesses 
and help secure its position as a major business hub in the world.
Singapore’s success is also very much an outcome of its unique political 
system. The near parliamentary monopoly that the ruling party has been able 
to maintain over the past half century allowed it to run the whole economy 
much like a corporate entity, focusing on GDP growth rate for the whole 
Hong Kong’s Business and Financial Hub Development: Factors, Challenges and Policy Implications • 193
economy, without having to be much distracted by equity and other domes-
tic political concerns. The strong political mandate it commands helps ex-
plain its ability to cater to the needs of the MNCs and foreign creative talents 
without strong resistance from domestic enterprises or domestic workers. It 
is not clear, however, if governments in other cities or business hubs would 
have the same luxury of pursuing the invitation strategy in the same sin-
gle-minded manner.
At the same time, Singapore’s experience has exposed the possible down-
sides of the invitation strategy. The overwhelming focus on serving the inter-
ests of the MNCs and foreign talents has contributed to an inadequate in-
digenous production capacity and indigenous innovative capacity. Without a 
sufficiently strong core of indigenous production and innovative capacity, 
the sustainability of the city-state’s business hub status could be in doubt, 
given the increasing footlooseness of the MNCs and foreign talents. These 
challenges point to the limit of the invitation strategy. More fundamentally, it 
calls for a rethink about the appropriate role that the government should 
play in promoting innovation vis-à-vis efficiency. 
In some sense, whether Singapore is able to overcome these two chal-
lenges will determine the success of the invitation strategy ultimately. When 
it first adopted the invitation strategy in the 1960’s, Singapore was hoping to 
move away from being a mere “middleman” economy through its position 
as a trading hub in the region, and to avoid the vulnerability that afflicts a 
middleman economy. Through the MNCs and later the global talents that it 
brought in, Singapore has managed to build up a production base with a 
wide range of manufacturing and services industries over the years. 
However, the economy’s strong reliance on MNCs and foreign talents, and 
the lack of an adequate local production capacity and local innovative ca-
pacity, suggests that Singapore might not have completely escaped such 
vulnerability. The ownership of the production capacity within the business 
hub might not be so critical an issue if the business hub is only part of a larg-
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er economy with a meaningful hinterland. But for a small city-state like 
Singapore where there is no clear distinction between the business hub and 
the economy, efforts should be made at an early stage of development to 
provide sufficient room for the domestic enterprises and the domestic work 
force to grow. An invitation strategy aimed only at attracting foreign re-
sources may not prove to be sustainable in the long run.
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Appendix
Appendix 5-1. Jurong Industrial Estate 
The Jurong Industrial Estate (JIE) is Singapore’s first industrial zone. Built 
on 69 square kilometers of mangrove swamp land, the construction marked 
the start of Singapore’s industrialization program recommended by Albert 
Winsemius, a Dutch economist who first led the United Nations Expanded 
Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) team to Singapore in 1960 and 
became the chief economic adviser to Singapore in 1961. The foundation 
stone for the first factory in JIE, the National Iron & Steel Mills (known as 
NatSteel today), was laid in September 1962. The company started oper-
ations in 1963. By 1968, more than 300 factories were operating in JIE, em-
ploying 21,000 workers. JIE played a large role in bringing down the un-
employment rate in Singapore from 14 percent in 1966 to about 4.5 percent 
by 1975. It also helped account for the sharp rise in the manufacturing sector 
from 12.2 percent of GDP in 1960 to 20.8 percent in 1973.
The JIE project was initially driven by the EDB, which was set up in 1960 
to help provide one-stop service to the MNCs investing in the estate. 
However, it soon became obvious that the task of managing industrial es-
tates would become more challenging and complex.47) In 1968, a new stat-
utory board, the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), was set up to manage JIE 
while freeing EDB to concentrate on marketing the estate to MNCs. Beyond 
management and development of the industrial estate, JTC was entrusted 
with the task of providing facilities to improve the well-being of the people 
working and living in the estate.48) New amenities such as Jurong Bird Park, 
47) “Goh tells of Govt plans to speed up economic growth,” Straits Times, April 17, 1968, p. 8. 
Retrieved from NewspaperSG.
48) Singapore. Parliament. Parliamentary Debates: Official Report. (May 21, 1968). Second 
Reading of the Jurong Town Corporation Bill (Vol. 27). Singapore: [s.n], cols 357–359. 
(Call no.: RCLOS 328.5957 SIN); “Better amenities for Jurong residents,” Straits Times, 
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Chinese Garden, Japanese Garden, Jurong Park, a town center with shop-
ping and commercial facilities, a drive-in cinema, and new executive flats for 
residents were constructed in the ensuing years.49) The residential estate, 
known as Jurong Town, evolved over time into a self-contained town for its 
estimated 32,000 residents. 
The changing composition of the industries within JIE reflected the evo-
lution of Singapore’s industrial structure. JIE started with labor-intensive, ex-
port-oriented industries such as textiles, toys, wood products, furniture, and 
hair wigs, and it moved steadily to higher value-added industries such as elec-
tronics, shipyard, petrochemical, precision engineering, and aerospace.50) To 
accommodate the needs of the new industries, the government continued to 
upgrade the infrastructures and make changes to business rules. Substantial 
land reclamation was carried out. There were also considerable re-zoning, 
changes in land use rules, and redevelopment of old sites within JIE. 
Over time, JIE was not only expanded, but it also was also re-designated 
into various specialized industrial parks, to achieve agglomeration effects for 
different industrial clusters. These include the Science Park that focused on 
research and development in the 1980s, the International Business Park lo-
cated in Jurong East as Singapore’s pioneer business park in 1992 and the 
Jurong Island Petrochemical Hub. Reflecting the dynamic development of 
JIE, the government announced in 2016 that the western part of the estate 
will be converted into the Jurong Innovation District.51) Billed as the 
“Industrial Estate of the Future,” the district will comprise Nanyang 
May 22, 1968, p. 5. Retrieved from NewspaperSG.
49) Jurong Town Corporation 1969, Annual Report. Singapore: Author, p. 9. (Call no.: 
352.0072 JTCAR); “Garden town to have 100,000 people: Woon,” Straits Times, December 
14, 1968, p. 9. Retrieved from NewspaperSG.
50) See https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/about-edb/company-information/our-his
tory.html.
51) See Budget 2016, announced by Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat in the Singapore 2016 
Budget Speech, http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/data/budget_2016/download/FY2
016_Budget_Statement.pdf.
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Technological University, Clean Tech Park, and other areas. It will be anoth-
er work-live-play zone for innovation industries (like the One North Estate 
in Appendix 5-3) that can accommodate more than 100,000 people. The first 
phase is expected to be completed by 2020.
Figure A5-1. Jurong Industrial Estate in the 1970s
Source: roots.sg.
Appendix 5-2: Jurong Island Petrochemical Hub
The construction and development of the Jurong Island Petrochemical 
Hub provides a good example of how a determined, multipronged approach 
has helped Singapore succeed in maintaining its position as a regional busi-
ness hub for MNCs in targeted industries. In the late 1970s, with three major 
oil refinery companies (Esso, Mobil, and SPC) operating on three adjacent 
south western islands, Singapore was already a major refining center in the 
world.52) However, the government recognized that, to maintain its global 
52) “The making of Jurong Island: The right chemistry,” Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore, 
2000, p. 17. (Call no.: RSING 711.5524095957 MAK); “Realising Jurong Island’s poten-
tial,” Business Times, December 1, 2009, p. 31. Retrieved from NewspaperSG.
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competitive position, it would need to aggressively expand and integrate the 
petroleum and petrochemical industries, to form a hub for the petrochemical 
and specialty chemical industries. A key challenge it faced then was the scar-
city of industrial land in that area. To overcome the challenge, the govern-
ment decided to carry out an ambitious and massive land reclamation project 
to join seven islands into a single Jurong Island. JTC was appointed as the 
agent to manage the project. Reclamation work began in 1995 and was com-
pleted in 2009. It increased the total land area from 991 hectares to 3,000 
hectares, at a cost of $7 billion.53) 
Today, Jurong Island serves as the operational base for more than 100 
companies (up from five in 1995) including global companies like DuPont, 
ExxonMobil, and Chevron. The output of the oil refining industry reached 
1.5 million barrels per day in 2014, compared with 1.17 million barrels a day 
in 1995. Output of refined petroleum products, too, has seen a tremendous 
uptick after 2000 when Jurong Island was officially opened, reaching a peak 
of S$59.6 billion in 2008 (up from about S$20.0 billion in 2000). 
By locating all the related companies together within close and inter-
connected vicinity, Jurong Island helps facilitate the agglomeration effect: 
companies are able to share facilities, common corridors, and centralized lo-
gistics, thereby reducing capital investment and minimizing operational 
costs. The output of some firms can serve as inputs for others on the island, 
reducing feedstock costs. The network for feedstock, logistics, and utilities 
also means that new businesses could be set up quickly and operated 
efficiently. Indeed, investment on the island rose rapidly. By 2015, total in-
vestments on Jurong Island had exceeded S$47 billion (including more than 
S$4 billion by ExxonMobil alone).54)
53) “Jurong Island, 20 years ahead of schedule,” Today, September 26, 2009, p. 24. Retrieved 
from NewspaperSG.
54) See NLB source as follows – http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_505_20
04-12-17.html.
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Phase Two of Jurong Island’s expansion and development was announced 
in 2010 after the initial phase was completed way ahead of schedule in 2009. 
Improvements are under way in the areas of energy, logistics and trans-
portation, feedstock, environment, and water supply. To stay ahead of com-
petitors, the government is planning to raise the capacity for liquefied natural 
gas terminals; increase infrastructure investment to help existing companies 
keep a competitive edge (for example, S$100 million to help ExxonMobil 
build a second plant) and set up downstream production in specialty 
chemicals. It is also trying to diversify the production structure on the island 
by including efforts to tap wasted “cold” energy from the LNG terminals to 
power a new sea water desalination plant. In 2012, US management con-
sultancy McKinsey & Company set up a green campus on the island to offer 
training in sustainable development and energy efficiency.
The success of Juring Island reflects in part the tight coordination among 
the government agencies involved in the project. In 1992, EDB encountered 
great difficulty when it first started actively marketing the island to major 
MNCs in the petrochemical and oil industries because reclamation works 
had not yet begun and the companies could not see the benefits of in-
tegration and amalgamation.55) JTC then worked with EDB to help the com-
panies visualize and establish their plants on the island. Various incentives 
and assistance were provided. JTC took an equity stake in some companies 
to share the business risks with them. It also shared with them certain man-
power training costs and helped them identify suitable third-party service 
providers.56) 
55) “The making of Jurong Island: The right chemistry.”
56) For example, a GLC, SembCorp Utilities and Terminals, was brought in to provide chem-
ical companies with utilities and other related services.
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Figure A5-2. Jurong Island Petrochemical Hub
Source: untouristsingapore.wordpress.com.
Appendix 5-3: One North Estate
A cluster development for R&D and innovation managed by JTC and 
A*STAR, One North is often billed as the type of industrial estate that will 
bring the Singapore economy into the future. It houses a number of industry 
clusters seen to be innovation-driven: bioscience, ICT, and media pro-
duction among them. By putting researchers, entrepreneurs, business oper-
ators, and even venture capital fund managers within the same “enclave,” 
One North Estate was designed to provide sufficient space for agglomer-
ation effects as well as strong linkages between local companies and MNCs.
A few notable hubs currently exist within the Estate: Biopolis, which is a 
biomedical R&D hub; Fusionopolis, an R&D hub for infocomm technology, 
media, physical sciences and engineering industries; Mediapolis, a self-con-
tained digital media cluster; and Block 71 and 79 of Ayer Rajah Industrial 
Estate, which house a number of digital start-ups and venture capital funds.
Various tax and non-tax incentives have been provided to companies to 
set up operations within One North. These include lower rental costs, 
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grants, and investment allowances. The government has substantially step-
ped up spending on R&D especially in biomedical science. It has also (either 
directly or through GLCs) taken up equity stakes in various enterprises to 
help spur their growth. One North’s close proximity to prominent educa-
tional and research institutions in Singapore adds to its attractiveness. These 
institutions include the Singapore Science Park, the National University of 
Singapore (NUS), the National University Hospital, and the Singapore 
Polytechnic, as well as the Asia-Pacific campus of INSEAD. The large con-
centration of intellectual, research, and scientific talents, together with the 
various possibilities of shared facilities, has played a critical role in promoting 
collaboration between researchers in private and public sectors.
Another key attractiveness of One North is the wide range of recreational 
amenities that the government has built up within or near the Estate to make 
it a highly livable area. One North is considered not just a place for work but 
one for play as well, and it is evolving into a mini-city. As noted in Section 3, 
this is seen as an important consideration for global creative talents in their 
relocation decisions.
Since it started in 200l, One North has made much progress. Today more 
than 250 leading companies and global institutions conduct R&D there and 
more than 600 start-ups are in the Estate. These include Abbott, GSK 
(GlaxoSmithKline), Lilly, Novartis, Schering-Plough, and Takeda within 
Biopolis; Vesta, Seiko Instruments, Solaris, and Starupbootcamp Fintech 
within Fusionopolis; and Discovery and AMX Audiophiles in Mediapolis. 
More than 24,000 people, including over 2,000 scientists from around the 
world, now work in One North.57) Within the biomedical science cluster, the 
manufacturing output has risen from S$6 billion in 2000 to S$29.4 billion in 
2012. By 2014, the number of people employed in the cluster had increased 
to more than 16,800 (from 6,000 in 2000). 
57) See One-North comes to life for business and retail. The Straitstimes (http://www.straitsti
mes.com/lifestyle/one-north-comes-to-life-for-business-and-retail).
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Figure A5-3. One North Estate
Source: untouristsingapore.wordpress.com.
Appendix 5-4: Wealth Management Industry
In its report released in 2003, the Economic Review Committee (ERC) 
identified wealth management as one of the four areas in the financial serv-
ices sector where Singapore could develop strong competitiveness in the re-
gion, considering the fast changing landscape in the sector, the decline in the 
traditional financial services and the increasingly more intense competition 
from other regional financial centres such as Hong Kong, Shanghai and 
Sydney.58)
A slew of policy changes and new incentives were put in place soon after 
that to help develop and grow the industry in Singapore. Changes were made 
in the legal and regulatory framework to render it more business- and 
tax-friendly for wealth managers, private banks, and high net worth 
individuals. Various exemptions were granted to simplify the license applica-
58) See https://www.mti.gov.sg/ResearchRoom/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/5
07/doc/12%20ERC_Services_Financial.pdf.
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tion process for financial institutions engaging in fund management. To ac-
celerate the increase in the supply of relevant professionals, the government, 
in addition to allowing for a greater inflow of foreign fund managers, ex-
panded fund management training programs at the higher learning in-
stitutions including setting up the Wealth Management Institute which was 
supported by equity participation of the two sovereign wealth funds, the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and Temasek Holdings.
Over the years, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), as the key 
promoting agency of the wealth management industry, has continued to im-
prove the market infrastructure to maintain Singapore’s strength in the 
industry. In 2014, for example, it signed on to two fund pass-porting 
schemes (ASEAN CIS and Asia Regional Funds Passport) to increase 
Singapore-based fund managers’ access to the region. It has also been build-
ing on Singapore’s position as the second largest offshore Renminbi centre 
in the world, to enhance the business opportunities for fund managers in the 
China. Working with the higher learning institutions and specialist training 
institutions like the Institute of Banking and Finance, it tries to ensure a suf-
ficient flow of qualified manpower to support the growth of the industry. In 
2015, it also unveiled major initiatives to keep pace with and to manage the 
impact of the latest developments in financial sector technology (FinTech). 
59)
The wealth management industry in Singapore has grown rapidly over the 
past 15 years.  By 2014, the assets under management (AUM) in Singapore 
had reached S$2.36 trillion, an almost 10-fold rise from S$276.2 billion in 
2000 (and twice the AUM of S$1.2 trillion in 2009). Its share of the val-
ue-added of the whole finance and insurance sector rose from 8.5% in 2010 
to 11.4% in 2015. In 2015, it continued to post the fastest growth rate among 
the sub-segments within the Finance and Insurance sector. (See Table 5-3) 
Importantly, a number of reputable private banks and fund managers have 
59) See MAS 2015.
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substantially enlarged their operations in Singapore or even shifted their 
global headquarters to Singapore, including those from Switzerland, reflect-
ing the increased importance of the city-state as a global wealth management 
hub.60) Comparative studies on major wealth management hubs in the world 
have also pointed to the stronger growth potential of Singapore relative to 
Switzerland and Hong Kong in the coming years.61)
Table A5-1. Share of Value Added in Finance & Insurance Sector (2015)
 
Share of Sector’s Value 
Added
(Nominal)
Real Growth Rate 
2015
(% yoy)
Finance & Insurance 100.0% 5.3%
Banking 47.5% 2.4%
Security Dealing 2.5% 6.3%
Fund Management 11.4% 12.9%
Insurance 15.2% 8.4%
Others 23.3% 6.9%
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore.
Appendix 5-5: Global Schoolhouse Program
The Global Schoolhouse program seeks to increase Singapore’s export of 
educational services by transforming the city-state into a regional education 
hub. The industry is seen as an essential part of the efforts to build up a crit-
ical mass of high-skill, creative workers that was crucial to the success of the 
innovation-driven growth strategy. Not only is education considered an in-
novation-driven industry on its own, it is also viewed as an enabler of the 
other key targeted industries. As the then Education Minister Teo Chee 
60) Julius Baer Private Bank from Switzerland being on such example. 
61) See for example, Credit Suisse, Report on “Switzerland as a Financial Center,” September 
2012.
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Hean noted in 2000, Singapore aspired to be the “Boston of the East,” so as 
to “create an oasis of talent in Singapore: a knowledge hub, an ideas ex-
change, a confluence of people and idea streams and an incubator for 
inspiration.”62) Four areas of focus were chosen based on their perceived 
high-growth potential: tertiary education, corporate training and executive 
education, private commercial and specialty schools, and preparatory and 
boarding schools.
A multipronged approach was used to promote the industry, both on the 
supply side and the demand side. On the supply side, through the World 
Class Universities initiative, the government tried to increase the number of 
university (both local and foreign), and other private tertiary education 
providers. Specifically, a target of having 10 world-class universities of ex-
cellence in Singapore was set. Generous incentives were given to foreign uni-
versities to set up campuses in Singapore, including subsidies for land cost 
and research grants as well as tax and other financial incentives. Efficient 
processing schemes were provided for visa and employment pass applica-
tions to bring in the staff needed to support the universities.
On the demand side, the EDB, working with Singapore Tourism Board, 
Spring Singapore, IE Singapore and the Ministry of Education, was tasked to 
increasing the number of foreign students (at all levels of education) to 
150,000 by 2015 (from 50,000 in 2002). To support these efforts, various in-
centives were unveiled including tuition grant schemes for foreign students, 
streamlined student visa requirements and processing, increased supply of 
student housing, expanded facilities for student financing, and enhanced em-
62) Teo noted that “Boston is not just Harvard or MIT. The Greater Boston area boasts over 
200 universities, colleges, research institutes and thousands of companies. It is a focal point 
of creative energy, a hive of intellectual, commercial and social activities. We want to create 
an oasis of talent in Singapore: a knowledge hub, an ideas exchange, a confluence of people 
and idea streams, an incubator for inspiration.” See “Education Towards the 21st Century: 
Singapore’s Universities of Tomorrow,” the Alumni International Singapore (AIS) Lecture, 
7 Jan 2000, in https://www.moe.gov.sg/media/speeches/2000/sp10012000.htm.
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ployment opportunities for foreign students and graduates. The Private 
Education Act (2009) sought to provide quality assurance for educational 
services provided in Singapore, to allay foreign student concerns about the 
educational investment they undertake (this came about after a series of 
complaints about unsatisfactory and fraudulent practices by a number of pri-
vate educational services providers in Singapore). 
The outcome for the Global Schoolhouse program has been mixed so far 
however. The number of educational establishment rose steadily 4,411 in 
2009 to 6,182 by 2013.  The value added of the industry increased from S1.7 
billion to S2.5 billion.  However, as a percentage of GDP, the contribution 
has gone up only from 0.7% to 0.8% during this period. (See Table 5-4) The 
number of foreign students in Singapore reached about 90,000 in 2011 (from 
50,000 in 2002) but fell to 75,000 in 2014. This was still far from the target of 
150,000 (by 2015).63)
The outcome on the actual presence of reputable foreign universities is al-
so mixed. There are a few successful partnerships such as Yale-NUS, 
Wharton-SMU, Duke-NUS (medical school), SUTD (with MIT and 
Zhejiang University). But a number of universities that came into Singapore 
under the World Class University program had to exit within a short period 
of time. These include University of New South Wales from Australia, the 
Tisch School of the Arts at New York University, and the University of Las 
Vegas. Reasons for such failures vary but disagreement on the funding mod-
els between the universities and the Singapore government has been cited as 
one of the key reasons.64)
63) See statistics provided by Spring Singapore in http://www.spring.gov.sg/Developing-Ind-
ustries/EDU/Pages/education-statistics.aspx.
64) See for example, Pak Tee Ng and Charlene Tan, 2010, “The Singapore Global Schoolhouse, 
An analysis of the development of the tertiary education landscape in Singapore,” International 
Journal of Educational Management, Vol 24, No 3, 2010. 
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Table A5-2. Education Services Industry in Singapore
Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
No. of Establishments 4,411 4,557 5,109 5,953 6,182
Operating Receipts ($b) 3 3.3 3.7 4.3 4.7
Value-added ($b) 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.7
GDP Contribution (%) 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Notes: Industry cluster as defined by SPRING, excludes Non-Profit Organisations, includes child care 
services for pre-school children.
Source: Department of Statistics & SPRING Singapore.
